Usually, at the Independent Center, we talk about domestic issues. Today, I’m going to take some liberties and take a foreign policy tour of the Middle East. First, this is not a comprehensive overview of the region, politics, or history. That cannot be done in 750 words. Second, while I do not claim to be a Middle East expert, I did spend seven years studying the region and language in college and graduate school, and I consider myself moderately well-informed.
On Saturday, I was at a friend’s house celebrating her birthday. Perfectly normal. While I had been paying attention to the fact that the Syrian Civil War had flared up, I figured it would be much like the last 15 years. Flashes here and there only to be put down by the Assad Regime and its allies. On my ride home, however, this was not the case. When I left the party, Assad was in control; when I got home, he was on a plane to Moscow. Throughout the 45-minute ride home, I watched a 53-year-old regime fall on X.
The TL;DR version of modern Syrian history is that it is officially the Syrian Arab Republic and has been governed by Hafez (1971-2000) and Bashar (2000-2024) Al-Assad since 1971. The Assad clan is of an ethnic and religious minority called the Alawites, which are a branch of Shi’i Islam. Because of this Shi’i background, Iran is a natural ally, and so is Hizballah. From 1976 to 2005, Syria effectively ruled Lebanon.
Syria is home to mainly Arabs, Alawites, Kurds, Lebanese, with smaller ethnic groups of Druze, Ismailis, Imamis, Nusairis, Assyrians, Turkmen, and Armenians. One of the many unintended consequences of the 2003 invasion of Iraq was the strengthening of Iran's Shi’i influence in the region. As a result, the US attempted a “redirection” to weaken Iran’s allies, most notably Syria. The redirection played a role in Syria’s uprising and civil war that began in 2011.
After decades of brutal rule, including the use of chemical weapons on minority populations and forced disappearances of political opponents, plus the destabilization in Iraq, the Arab Spring provided an opportunity to voice dissent in March of 2011. Within two years, a full-scale civil war had engulfed the country. Everyone and their brother was involved in the war, and there was no clear “good” side.
Last week, HTS (Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham or Organization to Liberate the Levant), led by former Al Queda, Daesh, and Al Nusra Front member Muhammed Al Julani toppled the Assad regime. Julani is a terrorist and is wanted for terrorism by the U.S. Department of Justice. HTS is designated a terrorist organization. Julani has taken some more moderating, though still Islamist, positions over the years and appears to want to focus on leading a transition that focuses on the basics of government administration.
Anyone confidently claiming to know what will transpire in the next few months is not being truthful; it will be a challenging balancing act for all parties involved, and nothing is guaranteed.
President-Elect Donald Trump has already stated that he prefers to let the dominoes fall where they may and for the U.S. to stay out. On the other hand, President Biden’s national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, will visit the region this week. By the time you are reading this, he is likely already in the region. Sullivan has also stressed the importance of keeping Daesh* from taking over Syria.
The decision to engage or abstain raises questions. What implications will U.S. policy have for regional allies like Jordan and Israel? How will it affect Türkiye, a NATO member? Türkiye shares a lengthy border with Syria and has faced numerous clashes with Kurdish groups, which it views as terrorist entities threatening Ankara’s governance. Would there be a possibility of invoking Article 5 in case of new conflict?
Russia was a key supporter of Bashar Al-Assad and instrumental in keeping him in power throughout the entire civil war. Russia has maintained air bases as well as a naval presence in Syria. What happens to these assets now that the government has fallen?
There is Iran. Iran no longer has a Shi’i ally in Syria. Hizballah has been taking a beating in southern Lebanon. And we are all familiar with Hamas in Gaza. This leaves Iran far weaker than it was two years ago. How will the Ayatollah react? An important thing to note is that the “I” in IRGC is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, not Iranian. How will IRGC leaders see this new weakness in the region? Will they return home to regroup and re-deploy? Will they lay low? Will they lash out wherever they happen to be like the UFC fighter making one last stand before the match is called?
Finally, there’s also the nuclear question. Israel won’t confirm or deny, but it is well understood they are a nuclear power. MIT Professor and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, Vipin Narang, counts Iran, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia as “hedgers,” countries that can produce a bomb but haven’t yet. It also wasn’t that long ago (2007) that Israel destroyed a North Korean build nuclear reactor in Syria. While the spectre of weapons of mass destruction has been overused in the past, most prominently as a reason to invade Iraq in 2003, it is worth keeping the idea close at hand.
A note on transliteration and language. Arabic does not use the Latin alphabet and includes several letters that do not have perfect analogs in the Latin alphabet. Consequently, transliteration can be nonstandard and open to interpretation by the translator. While there are a couple of different systems for transliteration, it can be all over the place. For instance, there are three ‘a’ sounds; the two ‘k’ and two ‘q’ sounds can all be transliterated as a ‘k’. Also, a hard g sound is absent in most Arabic, except Egyptian, but the hard ‘g’ and the soft ‘j’ are both represented by the same Arabic letter.
*I use Daesh to describe what is commonly referred to as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. This is for multiple reasons. For one, Isis has a long history as everything from a goddess in the ancient Egyptian pantheon, Lord Grantham’s dog in Downton Abby, and one of Catwoman’s cats in Batman. Second, and far more serious, is that the members of the Ulema like Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, Imam Syed Soharwardy, and Grand Mufti of Egypt Shawky Allam have all published legal opinions condemning their actions as kufr, which means 'disbelief', 'unbelief', or 'non-belief.'
Further Listening/Reading
Will al-Jolani and HTS Be Any Better Than Assad for Syria?
What Assad’s Fall Means for Russia in the Middle East
After Fall of Assad Dynasty, Syria’s Risky New Moment
Behind the Bastards Podcast Bashar Al Assad Part 1, Part 2
Conflicted Podcast Syria, The State of Syria, The Syrian Civil War Reignites